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Guilty of the Crime of Trust:
Nonstranger Rape
Beverly Balos* and Mary Louise Fellows**
There is a cop who is both prowler and father
he comes from your block, grew up with your brothers,
had certain ideals.
You hardly know him in his boots and silver badge,
on horseback, one hand touching his gun.
You hardly know him but you have to get to know him:
he has access to machinery that could kill you.
He and his stallion clop like warlords among the trash,
his ideals stand in the air, a frozen cloud
from between his unsmiling lips.
And so, when the time comes, you have to turn to him,
the maniac's sperm still greasing your thighs,
your mind whirling like crazy. You have to confess
to him, you are guilty of the crime
of having been forced...1
Feminist activists and theorists agree that a prerequisite
for securing a woman's selfhood is assurance of her physical se-
curity against male aggression. For this reason, the criminal
justice system's treatment of the crime of rape has come under
close scrutiny.2 Feminists rely on the law's definition of rape
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
** Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The au-
thors wish to thank Jonathon Carlson, Colia Ceisel, and Linda McGuire for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay.
1. A. RICH, Rape, in DIVNG INTO THE WRECK, POEMs 1971-1972, at 44
(1973).
2. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND
RAPE (1975); A. DwORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987); A. EDWARDS, RAPE, RACISM
AND THE WHITE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: AN ANSWER To SUSAN BROWNMILLER
(1979); S. ESTICH, REAL RAPE (1987); B. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MAR-
GIN TO CENTER (1984); D. RUSSELL, THE PoLrics OF RAPE (1975); Berger,
Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1977); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State, 8
SIGNS 635 (1983); Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analy-
sis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387 (1984); West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the
Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990); Wriggins,
Rape, Racism and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983).
This Essay uses the term rape because the term "criminal sexual conduct"
or the term "criminal sexual assault" has the effect of sanitizing the unique
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and the criminal justice system's treatment of rape to explore
misogyny, phallocentrism, and heterosexism. Their work has
resulted in widespread consensus throughout the feminist com-
munity that the law fails to provide physical security against
rape to middle-class white women. Their work also makes
clear that men rape women of African-American, Asian, His-
panic, and Native American descent with impunity. Racism
and sexism combine to make prosecutors less willing to pursue
a rape charge, juries less willing to convict, and judges less will-
ing to impose a sentence of equal severity when the victim is a
woman of color. Myths about the promiscuity of African-
American, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American women oper-
ate to make the criminal justice system disbelieve these wo-
men's accounts and to devalue their claims of physical
invasion.3
Feminists responded to the law's inadequacy on a number
of fronts. They lobbied for the establishment of rape victims'
advocacy programs4 and the passage of rape shield legislation as
well as reforms of state criminal codes. 5 These legislative ac-
complishments have led people to believe that substantial
strides have been made to protect all women against rape.
Most feminists, however, continue to believe that the criminal
justice system's treatment of rape remains inadequate.
harm to the victim. See S. ESTRICH, supra, at 81-83; Henderson, Review Essay:
What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 207 (1987-88).
3. One source of these myths comes from celebration of the domestic life
and the development of a parallel myth about the "cult of the lady." The
message of the cult was that a true woman belonged in the home to care for
and nurture the next generation of citizens. Those women who ventured
outside the home and became part of the harsh and unseemly commercial
world were not "ladies." They were labelled unchaste and viewed as accessi-
ble. In fact, men viewed women who were out and about as inviting or pro-
voking sexual advances. Only women who had husbands and fathers who
could provide them a home and the means to be a lady benefitted from the
cult. The rest, the women who earned their living as domestics, nursemaids,
and the like, suffered not only the unearned label of "whore," but the reality
of sexual violation. The cult of the lady was reinforced on the backs of un-
skilled laborers, who were disproportionately women of color. See, e.g., J.
JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE
FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985); M. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN
AMERICA (3rd ed. 1983); Hirata, Free, Indentured, Enslaved. Chinese Prosti-
tutes in Nineteenth-Century America, 5 SIGNS 3 (1979); Welter, The Cult of
True Womanhood, 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Hardgrove, An Interagency Service Network to Meet Needs of
Rape Victims, 57 Soc. CASEWORK 245 (1976).
5. See Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 767-68 (1986).
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One continuing aspect of the inadequacy of the treatment
of rape in the courts gained brief public attention in the fall of
1990. Opponents of Associate Justice Souter's nomination to
the Supreme Court,6 in particular women's rights groups, ar-
gued that his opinion in State v. Colbath 7 was nothing short of a
"blame the victim" polemic demonstrating a lack of legal so-
phistication about the law of rape and rape shield laws as well
as a general hostility toward women.
In Colbath, Justice Souter viewed the victim's conduct with
other men that same afternoon, as highly relevant in determin-
ing whether the victim later consented to sexual intercourse
with the defendant.8 He also appeared to be willing to infer
consent from the fact that the defendant and the victim had be-
come acquainted earlier in the day and had been seen touching
each other sexually. Other courts share Justice Souter's as-
sumptions about the relevance of the victim's prior acquain-
tance with the defendant. The California Appellate Court, for
example, made similar assumptions in People v. Perez9 when
analyzing the defenses of consent and reasonable, good faith be-
lief of consent in the context of a prior long-term sexual rela-
tionship.10 This Essay explores the judicial assumption that
proof of acquaintance allows a defendant more easily to argue
consent or, in the alternative, to argue that he had a reason-
able, good faith belief that the victim consented to sexual
intercourse.
The Essay builds on the work of feminist activists and the-
orists questioning the conventional wisdom, practice, and judi-
cial analytical assumptions that make nonstranger rapes more
difficult to prosecute and win. Nonstranger rape cases are
more difficult to prosecute successfully under current law be-
cause prosecutors and courts fail to apply the common law doc-
trine of confidential relationship that prevails in other areas of
the law. Current law allows defendants to use a preexisting re-
lationship to give credibility to a defense of consent or reason-
able, good faith belief of consent. If courts applied the doctrine
of confidential relationship, evidence of the relationship would
impose upon the defendant a heightened duty of care to the
6. Justice Souter was confirmed on October 2, 1990, by a vote of 90 to 9
in the United States Senate. 136 CONG. REC. S14,374 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990).
7. 130 N.H. 316, 540 A.2d 1212 (1988).
8. Id. at 324, 540 A.2d at 1216-17.
9. 194 Cal. App. 3d 525, 239 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1987).
10. Id- at 528-30, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 571-72.
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victim.11
Imposing the heightened duty of care associated with the
confidential relationship doctrine makes three distinct changes
to the prosecution of nonstranger rapes. First, it changes the
mental element of the crime because the heightened duty of
care requires that the defendant be found blameworthy for be-
ing inattentive to the victim's words or conduct indicating non-
consent, and for failing to obtain consent through positive
words or positive actions. Second, the heightened duty changes
the definition of consent to mean positive words or positive ac-
tion indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual contact.
Third, this heightened duty deters the defendant from intro-
ducing evidence of the prior relationship or prior conduct be-
tween the victim and the defendant as relevant to showing
consent to sexual contact during the disputed incident. Instead,
the prosecution may introduce evidence of the prior relation-
ship and conduct in order to impose on the defendant a height-
ened duty to obtain consent.
Part I of this Essay explores the doctrine of confidential re-
lationship and its use in contexts other than nonstranger rape.
Part II details the doctrine's applicability to the criminal prose-
cution of nonstranger rape. Part III examines the Colbath and
Perez decisions in order to demonstrate how application of the
confidential relationship doctrine would change the courts'
analyses and use of the evidence of prior relationships. Based
on the doctrine of confidential relationship, this Essay con-
cludes that the existence of a prior relationship between the de-
fendant and the victim should impose a heightened duty of care
on the defendant to obtain consent by positive words or actions.
I. THE CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE
A primary premise of the law's classical liberal tradition is
each individual's right to exercise her or his autonomy and re-
alize self with the minimum amount of constraint that others
impose.12 The obvious problem with this statement of the lib-
eral tradition is its failure to acknowledge that a person's lib-
erty and selfhood cannot be realized without connections with
other persons as well as freedom from those connections.
11. This analysis also supports legislative reform.
12. For an account of the liberal conception, see Mensch, The History of
Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRI-
TIQUE 13 (D. Kairys rev. ed. 1990); see also Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
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Therefore, one person's claim for liberty may result in a loss of
liberty for another. The law, in fact, acknowledges engage-
ment, dependency, and connection with others, and recognizes
that under certain circumstances it is appropriate both to pre-
vent a person from acting and to require a person to act. Confi-
dential relationship is one of the doctrines the law uses to
mediate conflicts between one person's right to act or not act
and another person's right to be free from the consequences of
that action or inaction.
Confidential relationship is not limited to one single mean-
ing in the law.' 3 Sometimes it is used to prevent one person
from overreaching another for economic gain. The law refuses
to police all economic interactions for overreaching, however,
and confines itself to policing those economic transactions
where the situation indicates that the victim was unable to pro-
tect herself or himself.' 4 One criteria for determining whether
a party to a transaction is unable to protect herself or himself is
whether the other party was in a position to dominate - a situ-
ation the courts then label a confidential relationship. Finding
a dominant party and, consequently, a confidential relationship
raises a rebuttable presumption that the economic transaction
was the product of undue influence. Examples of courts grant-
ing restitution based on finding a confidential relationship giv-
ing rise to a presumption of undue influence include a gift by a
client to a lawyer,15 a gift by a feeble brother to a younger sis-
ter,16 and a gift by an elderly woman to a bond salesman.17 Ev-
idence that one party was at a physical or mental disadvantage
and that the other party was in a position to take advantage of
those weaknesses is the key to the conclusion that the eco-
nomic transaction is not a product of one party's free will. 8
Confidential relationship has a different legal meaning
when applied to breach of a confidence.19 An example is a land
conveyance to a grantee who promises orally to hold it in trust
for the grantor or a third person. The Statute of Frauds writ-
13. See 4 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsTrruTION §§ 19.2-3, at 100-18 (1978).
The following analysis relies heavily on Professor Palmer's work.
14. See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997, 1024-38 (1985). See generally Dawson, Economic Duress - An
Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253 (1947).
15. See, e.g., Fisher v. Bishop, 108 N.Y. 25, 27, 30, 15 N.E. 331, 331-33 (1888).
16. See, e.g., Eldridge v. May, 129 Me. 112, 116-22, 150 A. 378, 379-82 (1930).
17. See, e.g., Stanley v. Shaw, 120 Me. 483, 485-88, 115 A. 263, 264-65 (1921).
18. For further elaboration of this discussion, see 4 G. PALMER, supra note
13, § 19.2, at 100-06.
19. See id § 19.3, at 108-18.
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ing requirement makes this trust of land unenforceable, but the
courts nevertheless provide constructive trust relief in favor of
the intended beneficiary if they find that the grantor and
grantee were in a confidential relationship. Courts give relief
not because the grantee obtained an economic advantage
through wrongful conduct of undue influence, but because the
grantee's failure to carry out the express trust was a breach of
the confidence reposed in her or him. When overreaching is
not the issue, the meaning of confidential relationship does not
turn on whether one person exercised dominance over the
other. Instead, courts find that:
[A] confidential relation exists not only where there is a fiduciary re-
lation such as exists between attorney and client, trustee and benefici-
ary, guardian and ward, and the like, but also where, because of
family relationship or otherwise, the transferor is in fact accustomed
to be guided by the judgment of the transferee or is justified in plac-
ing confidence in the belief that the transferee will act in the interest
of the transferor.
2 0
The doctrine of confidential relationship, whether reflect-
ing inequality of power or a relationship of trust, represents the
law's unwillingness to allow the classical liberal tradition of in-
dividuality to be the instrument of unjust treatment of one per-
son by another. Moreover, it goes further and imposes an
affirmative duty on one person to act in the interest of another.
The law imposes only limited duties between strangers, but re-
quires persons who are connected with each other to act in each
other's interest.
II. EXTENDING THE CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
DOCTRINE TO NONSTRANGER RAPES
Traditionally, the law has not treated nonstranger rape as
rape. Nonstranger rape has been a legal oxymoron for two rea-
sons. First, if a woman previously consented to any connection
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 44 comment c (1959).
A concept related to confidential relationship found in tort law and crimi-
nal law is the duty to rescue. The law in these areas imposes a duty to rescue
on persons who have made certain types of connections with each other. For
example, tort law imposes on an employer a duty to rescue an employee. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 333 U.S. 821, 823 (1948)
(per curiam). It also imposes a duty to rescue on persons other than those who
have economic relationships. For example, a court imposed a duty on one
friend to rescue another when they had been drinking together. Farwell v.
Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 291-92, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1976). The law's applica-
tion of the duty to rescue reinforces the proposition that a person takes on
legal responsibilities when she or he makes a connection with another person.
[Vol. 75:599
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with a man - developing a friendship with a male colleague or
superior at work, accepting a date, going to a bar or a party and
talking with a man (i.e., making a stranger a nonstranger
through conversation), agreeing to drive a man she has just met
to his home, allowing a man she just met to drive her home,
dating a man for an extended period of time, consenting to sex-
ual relations with a man once or many times, cohabitating with
a man, marrying a man - a presumption arises that she subse-
quently consented to sexual contact during the incident in
question.21 Second, she is considered responsible for having
placed herself in a situation that might result in sexual contact,
and, therefore, she must accept the consequences of her own
conduct (i.e., nonconsensual sexual contact).22 Of course, the
law does not explicitly state that a presumption arises nor does
it explicitly rely on the assumption of risk argument. This de-
scription, however, is a fair reading of many nonstranger rape
cases.2 3 Moreover, it explains why women do not make com-
plaints, why prosecutors refuse to take complaints seriously,
and why judges and juries refuse to convict defendants.
Just as was true for both types of confidential relationship
- trust and dominance - the history of the connection be-
tween the two people matters in rape law. Unlike the doctrine
of confidential relationship, however, current nonstranger rape
law does not impose a duty on the parties to act in each other's
interest nor does it inquire about inequality within the relation-
ship. On the contrary, under current law, a connection be-
tween the parties before the disputed sexual contact decreases
the likelihood of a successful rape prosecution and, therefore,
jeopardizes the woman's physical safety. She reposes trust in
her new acquaintance, her friend, her boss, her date, her lover,
or her husband at her own risk. Strikingly, in contrast to other
areas of the law that apply the doctrine of confidential relation-
ship, a history of connection operates to decrease, rather than
to increase, each other's responsibility to act in the interest of
the other with regard to sexual relations.
If the civil doctrine of confidential relationship were trans-
ported to the criminal arena, proof of a preexisting relationship
would create a presumption that the parties reposed trust in
each other and, based on that presumption, the law would re-
21. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 214.
22. See S. ESTRiCH, supra note 2, at 41.
23. See id at 25 n.62 (citing M. AMIN, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 259-76
(1971)).
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quire each party to exercise a heightened duty of care. The
civil law presumes trust from the fact that one party made a
promise to the other. Analogously, the criminal law should
presume trust from the fact of familiarity between the parties.
The justification for a presumption of reposed trust regard-
ing unwanted sexual contact is that familiarity encourages a
woman to be less wary. Failing to acknowledge the reposed
trust is equivalent to saying that women have a duty to be
wary. Not all women, of course, repose trust in every male ac-
quaintance, but this is no reason to deny women a right to
trust.
Therefore, a preexisting relationship between the victim
and the defendant should apply to assist, rather than to hinder,
the state's prosecution of the crime of rape.2 4 The two types of
confidential relationships will be considered separately for this
purpose. First, this Essay analyzes the prosecution of the crime
of rape assuming a trust-type relationship, and then modifies
the analysis by assuming a dominant-type relationship between
the defendant and the victim.
A. TiE TRUST-TYPE RELATIONSHIP
The first. way that a preexisting trust-type relationship
changes the prosecution of the crime of rape concerns the
mental element of the crime. Different jurisdictions have dif-
ferent definitions and degrees of rape,25 but the one element
common to the crime in all jurisdictions is sexual contact
against a person's will.26 Beyond this, the definition and degree
of rape varies based on the nature of the force required, the na-
ture of the sexual contact required, and what constitutes con-
sent.2 7 Although some courts have held that the state must
24. Professor Henderson warns against the wholesale transplantation of a
property concept into the law of rape because of the crime's history as being
against a man's property and because the doctrines themselves may not be
powerful enough to meet the unique circumstances of sexual violation. See
Henderson, supra note 2, at 219 n.97. The confidential relationship doctrine,
with its emphasis on the duty two persons owe to each other, seems not to risk
the reinfusion into the law of rape as a crime against a man's property. The
rest of this Essay is devoted to whether the doctrine as presently applied to
economic transactions is powerful enough to redress breaches of trust and
overreaching that occur in nonstranger rape.
25. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 197-200 (3d ed. 1982).
26. Id
27. See NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE, AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 5-19, 71
(1978); S. ESTRICH, supra note 2, at 83.
[Vol. 75:599
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prove that the defendant acted recklessly in failing to recognize
the victim's nonconsent,2 others only require the state to show
that the defendant's belief regarding consent was unreasona-
ble.29 The introduction of the confidential relationship doctrine
would substantially change the mental element. The standard
of attentiveness to the victim's interests would increase as a re-
sult of the preexisting trust relationship. This heightened duty
justifies conviction if the evidence establishes that the defend-
ant failed to obtain the victim's consent regardless of the de-
fendant's reasonable or good faith belief.
Conviction is justified based on this heightened standard of
attentiveness regardless of the duration of the relationship be-
tween the defendant and the victim and regardless of any past
sexual intimacy. Application of the confidential relationship
doctrine in the rape context acknowledges that the victim re-
posed trust in the defendant. Evidence of a prolonged intimate
relationship indicates that the victim reposed more trust in the
defendant than had the relationship been of a shorter more pla-
tonic nature. The argument put forward here, however, is that
any imposition of trust by the victim should be sufficient to
raise the heightened duty.
The second way that the preexisting trust-type relationship
affects the prosecution of the crime of rape is in the meaning
that courts accord the term "consent." This issue is obviously
closely connected to the question of the mental element and
the heightened duty imposed on a nonstranger for attentiveness
to the victim's interests. Silence or other passive behavior by
the victim would not constitute sufficient evidence of consent
between nonstrangers.30 The defense of a reasonable, good
faith belief that the words or conduct were overt and consti-
tuted consent also would not be available to the defendant, be-
cause it would undermine the heightened duty that arises out
of the preexisting relationship.
The heightened duty of care imposes an obligation on the
defendant to meet a stricter standard of conduct than mere rea-
sonable belief. This duty requires the defendant to inquire as
to the victim's desire for sexual contact and the form of contact
desired. The defendant's subjective belief that the victim's
28. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 626 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
29. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 155, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345,
125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 753 (1975).
30. This is already the definition of consent in a few states. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 261.6 (Supp. 1990); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7)
(Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
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words or acts constituted consent is not relevant because under
the heightened duty of care the defendant has no right to rely
on his own belief, but rather has the obligation to listen to the
victim.3 '
Another way to reconcile the heightened duty standard
with reasonable belief is to think of the heightened duty as
transforming the meaning of reasonable belief. Society expects
a person in a confidential relationship with another to exercise
more responsibility. The failure to meet that responsibility is
blameworthy. Thus, a reasonable belief consists of the defend-
ant determining consent based on the victim's positive words or
conduct.
The third way that the preexisting trust-type relationship
affects the prosecution of the crime of rape is that the evidence
proving the relationship becomes relevant for the purpose of
imposing a heightened duty of care on the defendant to deter-
mine the victim's consent. A prior relationship will no longer
be used, as is the current practice, to infer present consent from
the fact of previous consent. Although a defendant may still in-
troduce evidence of a preexisting relationship with the victim
in an attempt to raise questions in the jurors' minds about the
victim's credibility and morality, the primary purpose of this
evidence, as the jury instructions should indicate, would be to
impose a heightened duty of care on the defendant.
31. See Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217, 236-
37 (1989). Pineau contends that the "dialectics of desire" impose a responsibil-
ity on persons engaged in communicative sexuality to not misuse their position
of trust:
Just as a conversationalist's prime concern is for the mutuality of
the discussion, a person engaged in communicative sexuality will be
most concerned with the mutuality of desire. As such, both will put
into practice a regard for their respondent that is guaranteed no place
in the contractual language of rights, duties, and consent. The dialec-
tics of both activities reflect the dialectics of desire insofar as each
person's interest in continuing is contingent upon the other person
wishing to do so too, and each person's interest is as much fueled by
the other's interest as it is by her own .... To be intimate just is to
open up in emotional and personal ways, to share personal knowl-
edge, and to be receptive to the openness of the other. This openness
and sharing normally takes place only in an atmosphere of confidence
and trust. But once availed of this knowledge, and confidence, and
trust, one has, as it were, responsibility thrust upon one, the responsi-
bility not to betray the trust by misusing the knowledge. And only by
respecting the dialectics of desire can we have any confidence that we
have not misused our position of trust and knowledge.
[Vol. 75:599
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B. THE DOMINANCE-TYPE RELATIONSHIP
The legal significance to be accorded evidence showing that
the defendant had a pattern of exercising dominance over the
victim in their confidential relationship raises serious policy
questions. The fact of a preexisting relationship means that
under the trust branch of the confidential relationship doctrine
the defendant already has the burden of showing that the vic-
tim consented through positive words or positive conduct. Does
the added dimension of domination mean that the victim was
unable to exercise her free will to engage in sexual relations
with the defendant? Should proof of consent through positive
words or conduct be irrelevant and should sexual contact be-
tween the defendant and the victim be viewed as nonconsen-
sual, and thus rape?32
Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin have argued
that women do not have real choices in heterosexual sex be-
cause of the systemic presence of male dominance in relation-
ships between men and women and because our male-
dominated society eroticizes dominance.33 Although acknowl-
edging male dominance in heterosexual relationships does not
lead to the conclusion that all heterosexual sex should be
criminalized, it demands that the criminal law recognize the
impossibility of consent in egregious circumstances where a
man exercises control over a woman through physical and
mental intimidation. The dominance branch of the confidential
relationship doctrine is the means by which the courts could ac-
knowledge the impossibility of a victim's consent. If the state
shows that the defendant had a history of physically abusing
the victim within the definitions used for domestic abuse prose-
cutions, the defense that the victim consented to the sexual
contact with positive words or positive conduct would be
unavailable.34
32. The concept that victims cannot exercise free will in certain situations
has achieved limited recognition in some areas of the criminal law. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.344(1)(h)-(k), 609.345(1)(h)-(k) (1990) (consent not a de-
fense when a psychotherapist and current patient, or former patient who is
emotionally dependent upon the psychotherapist, engage in sexual penetration
or sexual contact).
33. See A. DwoRKIN, supra note 2; MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 646-47.
34. The criminal law has recognized that the nature of the relationship
between the victim and the abuser creates the need for special circumstances
in the criminal justice system's treatment of domestic violence. In recognition
of this relationship, statutory schemes have been amended in an attempt to
provide increased protection for the victim. For example, in Minnesota, prob-
able cause nonpresence arrest is permitted in misdemeanor domestic assault
1991]
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This approach acknowledges the myth of a woman's choice
under circumstances where survival to the next hour or day is
itself a struggle. It might also serve to empower the woman in
a dominant-type relationship. In these circumstances, even if
her words or conduct affirmatively indicated consent to sex,
both she and he would know that this is no defense to a rape
complaint. Therefore, the dominance prong of confidential re-
lationship doctrine may both empower the woman to pursue a
rape prosecution and create for the man an interest in cur-
tailing his behavior designed to control and dominate her. The
argument, however, that an abstract evidentiary rule regarding
the law of rape will empower a woman who daily is subjected
to intimidation, at best, poses an interesting academic debating
point, and, at worst, devalues the intense harm that an abused
woman experiences.
Admittedly, applying the dominant-type confidential rela-
tionship doctrine in this manner may result in diminishing a
woman's selfhood. Application of the trust-type confidential re-
lationship to nonstranger rape empowers a woman to control
access to her body. Unless she overtly demonstrates her sexual
desires through acts or words, her male acquaintance is denied
access. To assume that these same overt words or acts demon-
strate consent when the woman has been a victim of physical
and mental intimidation, however, is to ignore her life. Essen-
tially, it would remove her right to agree to consensual sex.
Once again, the question poses the familiar dilemma between
acknowledging a woman's subordination and protecting against
it and celebrating her autonomous and actualized self.
One possible solution to this dilemma is that courts could
restrict application of the dominance branch of the confidential
relationship doctrine to situations where the prosecution shows
that the sexual contact occurred within some reasonably short
time period after an incident of physical abuse. Only under cir-
cumstances of recent physical abuse would proof of the wo-
man's affirmative words or conduct agreeing to sexual contact
not be a defense. If a woman were to consent to sex freely or
seek sex from her partner, it would likely be during a time pe-
riod when the man had not been overtly abusive. Limiting ap-
plication of the dominance-type confidential relationship
cases. MINN. STAT. § 629.341(1) (1990). When police make an arrest they must
bring the arrested individual to the police station or jail rather than merely
issue a citation. Id § 629.72 (1990). Arrest is mandatory when a previously is-
sued order for protection is violated. Id. § 518B.01(14) (1990).
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doctrine to instances when overt abuse recently occurred would
validate the woman's sexual choices in those circumstances
when the possibility of choice was greatest.
Two reasons, however, mandate against restricting the use
of the dominance-type confidential relationship rule. First, it
fails to recognize that domination and intimidation persist in a
relationship regardless of whether the man has recently or re-
peatedly manifested that domination and intimidation through
physical abuse. Second, the proximate timing of overt physical
abuse will become the cornerstone of a batterer's defense to
rape and will do little to protect abused women from sexual in-
vasion. It will mean that the only battering that makes a dif-
ference will be the overt abuse that occurs near and around the
rape. The legal rules would continue to fail to reflect the real-
ity of a battered woman's life.
III. TWO CASE STUDIES
Analysis of two cases, People v. Perez35 and State v.
Colbath,36 illustrates the current implications of a preexisting
relationship between the victim of rape and the rapist and how
those implications can result in a cruel distortion of the rape
event. Both cases deal with jury instructions based on eviden-
tiary restraints adopted pursuant to rape shield laws. Rape
shield laws are an attempt to reverse the admissability under
common law, and even modem codifications, of evidence of the
previous sexual conduct of the victim as relevant to the issue of
consent.3
7
Rape shield laws vary among the states in how much they
restrict inquiry into the victim's past sexual history. Twenty-
five states have adopted an approach modeled after Michigan's
rape shield statute.38 These statutes prohibit the introduction
of sexual conduct evidence subject to certain exceptions. 39 The
primary exception in all these statutes is that they permit the
introduction of evidence of past sexual conduct between the
victim and the defendant.40 Perez and Colbath demonstrate
35. 194 Cal. App. 3d 525, 239 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1987).
36. 130 N.H. 316, 540 A.2d 1212 (1988).
37. See Galvin, supra note 5, at 765-66. Before the enactment of these
statutes, some courts even permitted evidence of unchastity to be used to im-
peach a victim's credibility on the theory that promiscuity imports dishonesty.
I&i at 766, 787 n.115 (citing Berger, supra note 2, at 3).
38. See Galvin, supra note 5, at 773.
39. See, e.g., MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1990).
40. See Galvin, supra note 5, at 813-14.
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that the statutory reform designed to protect the victim from
having the defense use her past relationships to attack credibil-
ity and character, has become an imprimatur for the defendant
to introduce evidence of a past relationship between the de-
fendant and the victim as a strategy to lend credibility to the
defendant's claim of consent or reasonable good faith belief of
consent.
A. PEREZ
In Perez, a 1987 California Appeals Court decision, the de-
fendant was convicted in the trial court of forcible rape and
burglary.41 The appellate court set forth the facts as follows:
The defendant and the victim had lived together for three
years. For six months thereafter, until October 7, 1985, they
dated occasionally and engaged in consensual intercourse. On
the evening of October 14, 1985, the defendant entered the vic-
tim's house through her window despite her protests and ef-
forts to stop him. She resisted his subsequent hugs and kisses,
but he threatened her with a knife, forcing her into her bed-
room. He choked, hit, and bit her, and ultimately had inter-
course with her. After the defendant fell asleep, the victim
escaped and contacted the authorities. Photographs and medi-
cal testimony established that she had extensive bruises and
bite marks.4
The defendant admitted entering the victim's home
through her window but contended that the ensuing inter-
course was consensual. He denied having a knife, and although
he admitted that she initially appeared upset, he testified that
after he hugged, kissed, and talked to her, she let him carry her
to bed. He contended that "she did nothing to indicate that she
did not want to have intercourse. '4 3 He explained her injuries
by stating that she bruised easily and the bite marks were
"monkey bites."'
The defendant raised the defenses of consent and reason-
able, good faith belief as to the victim's consent. The issue
before the court was whether a jury instruction that allowed
consideration of prior consensual sexual intercourse between
the defendant and the victim in order to evaluate the defense of
consent also applied to the defense of reasonable, good faith be-
41. 194 Cal. App. 3d at 527, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
42. Id at 528, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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lief of consent. 45 The jury instruction in question embodied the
evidentiary restrictions in the California Evidence Code.46 The
Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant that the jury in-
struction should have been expanded to apply to the defense of
reasonable, good faith belief 4 7 It found, however, that the fail-
ure to modify the jury instruction to include reasonable, good
faith belief of consent was harmless error in the case at bar.48
Although the court affirmed the conviction, language in
the court's analysis reveals its view that the existence of a rela-
tionship between the parties militates toward inferring consent
rather than, analogous to other areas of the law, imposing a
heightened duty of care to ensure consent. The court supported
its decision to modify the jury instruction by stating that under
the defendant's version of the facts, consent was manifested, as
it historically had been, by conduct - acquiescence - and not
by words.49 Therefore, the court decided that the victim's prior
consensual intercourse was highly relevant on the issue of the
defendant's reasonable, good faith belief of consent. In so rul-
ing, the court viewed acquiescence as relevant even when the
encounter was aggressive and predatory.
Even the defendant's own testimony that "[the victim] did
nothing to indicate that she did not want to have intercourse"
at best only minimally supports consent.50 The defendant did
not claim that the victim did or said anything to indicate that
she wanted to have intercourse with this man who had climbed
through her window.
The court supported its determination that failure to mod-
ify the jury instruction was harmless error by distinguishing
this rape from the previous encounters. The court noted that
the defendant denied ever hitting or kicking the victim before,
"negating any inference that resistance on the victim's part,
and physical force on his part played a role in prior consensual
acts."5 1 Strikingly, the court did not question the notion of con-
sent in the context of the defendant's aggressive physical force,
45. Id at 528, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
46. Id. at 529, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
47. Id., 239 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
48. Id at 530, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
49. Without explanation, the court makes no reference to CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261.6 (West Supp. 1990), which defines consent to mean "positive coop-
eration in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will." Under this defi-
nition, acquiescence alone seems inadequate.
50. Perez, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 528, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
51. Id at 530, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
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at least in so far as past encounters were concerned. Implied in
the court's statement was the notion that if the past history be-
tween the victim and the defendant had included physical vio-
lence, the defendant's present contention of good faith,
reasonable belief in consent would gain credibility. Thus, the
court suggested that violent behavior that induces acquiescence
would be rewarded rather than discouraged. Contrary to the
court's apparent logic concerning the effect of evidence of past
physical violence, the proposed dominance-type confidential re-
lationship rule would mandate conviction for rape upon a show-
ing of sexual contact and invalidate the defense of consent.
Under a trust-type confidential relationship analysis, the
defendant's claim that the victim did nothing to indicate that
she did not want to have intercourse would not be a sufficient
defense. The court would have to acknowledge the trust that
this preexisting relationship induced and impose on the defend-
ant a heightened degree of care. The court would have been
compelled to examine whether the victim's trust in the defend-
ant had been violated by the defendant's failure to exercise the
utmost care in determining whether the victim wanted to par-
ticipate in sex. Thus, under a confidential relationship analysis,
instead of the defendant introducing evidence of a preexisting
relationship between the defendant and the victim to bolster
his defense of consent, the prosecution would use this evidence
to establish that the defendant's conduct be judged according to
a heightened duty of care.
B. COLBATH
In Colbath, Justice Souter, writing for the New Hampshire
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction of aggra-
vated felonious assault.52 The court described the circum-
stances surrounding the assault as follows:
During the noon hour of June 28, 1985, the defendant ... went
with some companions to the Smokey Lantern tavern... where he
became acquainted with the female complainant. There was evidence
that she directed sexually provocative attention toward several men
in the bar, with whom she associated during the ensuing afternoon,
the defendant among them. He testified that he had engaged in "feel-
ing [the complainant's] breasts [and] bottom [and that she had been]
rubbing his crotch" before the two of them eventually left the tavern
and went to the defendant's trailer. It is undisputed that sexual inter-
course followed; forcible according to the complainant, consensual ac-
cording to the defendant. In any case, before they left the trailer the
52. State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 325, 540 A.2d 1212, 1217 (1988).
[Vol. 75:599
NONSTRANGER RAPE
two of them were joined unexpectedly by a young woman who lived
with the defendant, who came home at an unusual hour suspecting
that the defendant was indulging in faithless behavior. With her sus-
picion confirmed, she became enraged, kicked the trailer door open
and went for the complainant, whom she assaulted violently and drag-
ged outside by the hair. It took the intervention of the defendant and
a third woman to bring the melee to an end.
As soon as the complainant returned to town she accused the de-
fendant of rape, and the police promptly arrested and charged him
accordingly.
53
On appeal, the defendant objected to the jury instruction
that evidence of the victim's behavior with men other than the
defendant in the hours preceding the incident was irrelevant to
the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence.M During the
course of the trial, the defense elicited testimony of the victim's
public activities that afternoon with various men, including her
own admission that she had engaged in close physical contact
with at least one man besides the defendant.55 The trial court's
jury instruction reflected its earlier ruling in the case on a mo-
tion in limine to restrict this testimony. The judge explained
that the testimony in question had been received only to pro-
vide background information, and that the jurors were to ig-
nore evidence regarding the victim's conduct with other
individuals as irrelevant to whether she gave consent to sexual
intercourse. The New Hampshire Supreme Court treated this
instruction as an order to strike the testimony concerning "the
complainant's openly observed behavior with other men during
the course of the afternoon."5 7
In reversing the conviction, the supreme court emphasized
the public aspect of the victim's alleged behavior. The court
narrowed the purpose of the rape shield law to an intention to
honor the victim's interest in preserving the privacy of intimate
activity. Thus narrowed, the victim's interest in protection
became trivialized. The court then proceeded to balance the
privacy interest of the victim against the defendant's constitu-
tional interest in confronting witnesses and presenting evi-
dence.58 Not surprisingly, framing the question as a balance
between a defendant's constitutional rights and a victim's al-
ready devalued interest dictated the supreme court's answer.
53. I at 317-18, 540 A.2d at 1212-13.
54. Id. at 321, 540 A.2d at 1214.
55. Id, 540 A.2d at 1215.
56. See id. at 322, 540 A.2d at 1215.
57. Id-
58. Id. at 325, 540 A.2d at 1217.
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The supreme court asserted with no apparent authority
other than its own personal belief that "evidence of public dis-
plays of general interest in sexual activity can be taken to indi-
cate a contemporaneous receptiveness to sexual advances that
cannot be inferred from evidence of private behavior with cho-
sen sex partners. ' 59 The court cited no empirical support for
its assumption that public displays of general interest in sexual
activity are evidence of some sort of nonparticularized recep-
tiveness to sexual advances. The court's unsupported view as-
sumed away any question that this behavior was relevant to the
incident in question. According to the court, public behavior by
women that might indicate a general interest in sex was viewed
as an indication of "contemporaneous receptiveness"6 0 - a re-
ceptiveness that is apparently non-selective. Further, although
the court talked about "contemporaneous receptiveness" and
the "publicly inviting acts" occurring closely in time to the al-
leged sexual assault,61 the court never specified how much time
elapsed between the victim's behavior and the rape. We are
left to speculate as to how long a woman indicating general in-
terest in sexual activity remains vulnerable to the sexual ad-
vances of men.
The supreme court further emphasized its support of male
access to women by speculating on the attitude of the victim.
The court theorized that the jury could have taken evidence of
the victim's "sexually provocative behavior toward a group of
men as evidence of her probable attitude toward an individual
within the group."6 2 The court went on to speculate that
"[e]vidence that the publicly inviting acts occurred closely in
time to the alleged sexual assault by one such man could have
been viewed as indicating the complainant's likely attitude at
the time of the sexual activity in question."6 3
While recognizing that the procedural posture of the case
requires the appellate court to consider whether the excluded
evidence of the victim's behavior prejudiced the defense, this
court adopted an analysis that goes beyond that necessary for
judicial review. The progression of language the court used is
notable. The court initially characterized the victim's behavior
as sexually "provocative." 64 The victim's "provocative activi-
59. IM,
60. Id, at 324, 540 A.2d at 1217.
61. Id.
62. IM
63. Id
64. Id. at 320, 540 A.2d at 1214.
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ties" became "sexually suggestive conduct," which the court fi-
nally described as "publicly inviting acts. '6 5
The court then speculated that the defendant's companion
could have inflicted the victim's injuries. Further, the court
suggested that the companion's attack on the victim could be
regarded as a motive for the victim to lie in order to explain
her injuries and "excuse her undignified predicament." 66 Ac-
cording to the court, the victim not only publicly invited acts
and had a minimal interest in being protected from inquiry con-
cerning her actions with others, but also had a motivation to
make a false accusation. Thus, Colbath illustrates that long-
held concepts of victim provocation and fear of the falsely ac-
cusing woman remain a part of judicial reasoning.
Nowhere does the court analyze the relationship between
the defendant and the victim as it would in other contexts in
terms of trust and the resulting duty of care that arises out of
that relationship. If the court had recognized the significance
of the relationship in these terms, the relationship then would
have become, as it would have in Perez, evidence to be elicited
by the prosecutor to show that the duty should have been trig-
gered in this instance. The duty that would arise is an obliga-
tion to ascertain with certainty that the other party is in fact
consenting to sexual activity. If the circumstances result in am-
biguity, sexual activity should not occur unless and until that
ambiguity is positively clarified and consent is certain.
Although the confidential relationships at issue in Perez
and Colbath differ as to longevity and prior sexual intimacy,
both relationships were sufficient for the victims to have re-
posed trust in the defendants. Instead of viewing trust as an
experience to be respected and as an element creating an addi-
tional duty on the part of the defendants, as courts routinely do
in other areas of the law, in both cases the preexisting relation-
ships were used to the detriment of the victims.
CONCLUSION
The argument in this Essay is straightforward. First, the
Essay describes how courts use the common law doctrine of
confidential relationship to require one person to act in the in-
terest of another. The Essay then explains why and how this
common law doctrine should apply to nonstranger rapes. The
65. Id. at 324, 540 A.2d at 1217.
66. I&
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precise nature of the relationship is unimportant. The key is
whether a connection has been made so that the victim's famili-
arity with the defendant may lead her to trust him to respect
and act in her interest. Even in situations where the relation-
ship has ended, the continuing familiarity gives rise to a contin-
uing repose of trust. In general, the victim will not be as wary
of a nonstranger as of a stranger notwithstanding that the na-
ture of the relationship may have changed. Given the severity
of the harm and pain that rape victims experience, the obliga-
tion positively to inquire so that unequivocal consent is ob-
tained seems a minimal requirement indeed.
